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Internal and External Discipline Following
Securities Class Actions
Abstract
Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The
SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, share-
holders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA).
While some literature has examined SEC actions, it has not examined
SCAs, and has not examined external discipline and the managers’s
future employment prospects after either action. Thus, using a sam-
ple of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a
catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO/CFO turnover and
CEO/CFO pay-cuts, and harm CEOs future job-prospects. This sug-
gests that even if the law governing SCAs is sub-optimal, they can still
induce internal and external discipline.
Keywords: Securities Class Actions, Securities Law, Governance, Ethics,
Takeovers, Managerial Turnover, Fraud, Disclosure
JEL Classification: G28, G34, G38, K22, K41
1 Introduction
This paper examines what happens to the managers of companies that are
accused of poor disclosure and of issuing misleading statements. CEOs,
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CFOs, and the companies they manage, may mislead the market by issuing
false statements or by concealing value-relevant information. I hypothesize
that a SCA highlights poor managerial ethics and governance. I predict
that this signal encourages boards to discipline managers by firing them
or reducing their pay, harms managers’ future job prospects, and makes
the firm a target for a disciplinary takeover designed to remove inefficient
managers. I find support for these predictions using a sample of 416 SCAs.
Two legal ramifications for misleading the market are a ‘securities class
action’ (SCA) initiated by shareholders and a ‘regulatory action’ initiated
by the SEC. The difference between SCAs and regulatory actions impor-
tant for two reasons: (1) The regulator initiates and funds a regulatory
action. Shareholders initiate securities class actions, often at the suggestion
of a lawyer. They often receive funding from an external litigation funder
who funds the action in return for a share of the winnings.1 Thus, SCAs
may capture risker cases that the regulatory might ignore (Chen, Firth, and
Gao, 2005; Chen, 2003). (2) The law on SCAs has received substantial crit-
icism,2 so it is unclear whether SCAs are currently an effective disciplinary
mechanism.
There is limited empirical evidence on the ramifications of SCAs or reg-
ulatory actions. The literature on regulatory actions shows that (1) regula-
tory actions reduce firm value (Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles, 1998; Karpoff and
Lott, 1993); and, (2) regulatory actions (as opposed to SCAs) can induce
CEO turnover and pay cuts (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Karpoff, 1999; Karpoff,
Lee, and Martin, 2008). The literature on SCAs has focused on the com-
pany and CEO characteristics that make securities class actions more likely
1An example is the DQE Inc litigation, in which the lawyers obtained 33.3% of a USD
12 million settlement.
2See for example: Fox (2005, 2006); Humphery-Jenner (2011b); Langevoort (1996);
Lev and de Villiers (1994).
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(see for example Griffin, Lont, and Segal, 2010; Johnson, Ryan, and Tian,
2009b; Jones and Wu, 2010; Peng and Röell, 2008). The literature has not
examined the implications of SCAs for managers, or of either action for
external discipline and future job prospects.
This paper addresses several gaps in the literature: (1) Do SCAs induces
internal discipline in the form of job-losses. (2) Does misconduct harm
future job prospects? (3) Does misconduct precipitate falls in managerial
compensation? (4) Does misconduct induce external discipline in the form
of a disciplinary takeover?
I address the relation between SCAs and internal/external discipline.
I examine a sample of 416 SCAs that occur between 1996 an 2007 and
compare them to a control sample comprising 11,767 firm-year observations.
I focus on internal and external discipline following the announcement of a
SCA.3 The paper tests four issues: (1) do SCAs destroy corporate value, (2)
do SCAs precipitate CEO/CFO turnover and harm managers’ future job
prospects, (3) do CEOs/CFOs suffer pay cuts following SCAs, and , and (4)
do SCAs make disciplinary takeovers more likely?
The results show that SCAs significantly reduce firm value, as proxied
by the market’s reaction to the announcement of litigation, significantly
increase the likelihood that the CEO and CFO will suffer a pay cut or
leave the company, and significantly increase the likelihood of receiving a
disciplinary takeover bid. This implies that even if the law governing SCAs
is sub-optimal, it does have tangible governance implications.
These findings make several important contributions to the literature.
First, they provide new insight into the internal and external governance
3The focus on the announcement rather than the settlement is to (a) avoid any look-
ahead bias, and (b) to avoid any contamination arising from the effectiveness (or lack
thereof) of either party’s legal representation.
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following the initiation of a SCA. Second, they show that fraudulent conduct
can induce disciplinary takeovers. Third, the results show that SCAs harm
CEOs’ job-prospects at other firms. Fourth, they show that boards are
willing to perform their over-sight function by reducing CEOs’ fixed salary
compensation. Overall, the results help to further our understanding of the
disciplinary implications of engaging in fraudulent conduct.
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops hy-
potheses and empirical predictions. Section 3 discusses the sample con-
struction. Section 4 tests the threshold issue of whether securities litigation
reduces firm value. Section 5 determines if turnover increases following liti-
gation. Section 6 tests whether CEO and CFO compensation falls following
securities litigation. Section 7 examines whether securities class actions
make disciplinary takeovers more likely. Section 8 ensures that the results
are robust, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Hypothesis Development and Empirical Predic-
tions
The goal is to examine whether SCAs encourage internal or external dis-
cipline. A threshold issue is whether class actions reduce firm value. This
induces several predictions.
The threshold prediction is that securities class actions should reduce
firm value. The rationale is that poor disclosures and governance imply
agency conflicts and poor managerial ethics. This should reduce firm value
(Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva, 2006; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). Securities
fraud implies inadequate or misleading disclosure (Fox, 2005). Therefore,
securities class actions should imply reductions in firm value. Consistent
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with this, prior literature shows that firm values decrease following pros-
ecutions for criminal fraud (Karpoff and Lott, 1993) and SEC regulatory
actions (Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles, 1998).
The occurrence of a SCA should reduce value even if the manager is
likely to be disciplined. This is because (1) future disciplining is uncertain,
(2) the occurrence of a SCA sheds doubt on the firm’s reported performance
and governance, and (3) the SCA implies that the current market value is
based on false information; and thus, that the stock might be over-priced.
Therefore, the threshold prediction (in Prediction 2.1) is that the firm’s
value decreases upon announcement of the securities class action.
Prediction 2.1 (Value Reduction Prediction). The firm’s value decreases
upon announcement of the securities class action.
I predict that SCAs will also encourage disciplinary actions. The over-
arching theory is that the occurrence of a SCA implies poor governance and
managerial malfeasance. If the board (or the market for corporate control)
functions properly, then it should discipline managers for this malfeasance.
This induces several discipline-related hypotheses.
First, securities class actions should increase the likelihood of CEO and
CFO turnover. Boards are less likely to remove strong-performing managers
than they are to remove poorly performing managers (Kang and Shivdasani,
1995; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). Subsequently, Lehn and Zhao (2006)
find that CEOs who make value-reducing takeovers are significantly more
likely to be fired. Further, Kang (2008) and Tillman (2009) suggest that
fraud-actions harm the firm’s reputation. This implies that managers whose
conduct invites SCAs should be more likely to be fired.
CFOs should also be more likely to be fired following securities class
actions. This is for two reasons. (1) The two parties mainly responsible
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for financial disclosure are the CEO and the CFO (Arjoon, 2005). Both,
CEOs and CFOs have fiduciary responsibilities vis-à-vis the firm (Indjejikian
and Matejka, 2008). Subsequently, Tillman (2009) shows that (a) law suits
name CFOs in 78% of cases and name CEOs in 90% of cases; and (b) 94%
of cases that name the CFO also name the CEO. (2) CEOs and CFOs
generate close working ties. These ties might make it difficult to maintain a
co-operative relationship with the CFO if the board dismisses the CEO in
acrimonious circumstances (Buettner, Hilger, Richter, Schaffer, and Zander,
2010; Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Shen and Cannella, 2002). Therefore, SCAs
should increase the likelihood of CFO dismissal, but should mainly do so
when the CEO is also dismissed. This induces the prediction:
Prediction 2.2 (Managerial Turnover Prediction). A CEO and/or a CFO
is more likely to leave a company in year t+1 if there was a securities class
action in year t. Firing should harm the manager’s future job prospects.
Second, securities class actions should reduce CEO and CFO pay. The
compensation literature indicates that CEO pay should be sensitive to per-
formance (Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles, 1995; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
Conduct inviting a regulatory action or a SCA is some evidence of poor
performance. Subsequently, Persons (2006) suggests that SEC regulatory
actions induce CEO pay cuts. This indicates that SCAs should similarly
sound in pay reductions. To the extent that CFOs are also held responsible
for releasing false information to the market, CFOs should also suffer pay
cuts. A well functioning board should especially target reductions in fixed
salary-based compensation, rather than stock-linked compensation, in order
to avoid further misaligning shareholder-manger incentives (following Kang,
Kumar, and Lee, 2006; Mehran, 1995). This induces Prediction 2.3.
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Prediction 2.3 (Managerial Pay Prediction). Litigation in year t should
increase the likelihood that the CEO’s (and CFO’s) pay is lower in year
t+ 1.
Third, securities class actions should increase the likelihood of a ‘disci-
plinary’ takeover. A disciplinary takeover is one whose purpose is to remove
inefficient managers or to address agency conflicts (Martin and McConnell,
1991; Offenberg, 2009; Scharfstein, 1988). While Agrawal and Jaffe (2003)
find little evidence to support the claim that under-performing targets are
subject to takeover bids, other literature finds that poor internal governance
encourages disciplinary takeovers (see John and Senbet, 1998; Kini, Kracaw,
and Mian, 1995, 2004; Shivdasani, 1993). Behavior that induces a securities
class action could evidence agency conflicts. Subsequently, firms that are
subject to a securities class action in year t should be more likely to sustain
a ‘disciplinary’ takeover bid in year t+ 1. This induces Prediction 2.4.
Prediction 2.4 (Disciplinary Takeover Prediction). A securities class ac-
tion in year t increases the likelihood of a disciplinary takeover bid in year
t+ 1.
I note that there are two alternative hypothesis. First, (a) poorly per-
forming managers are more likely to inspire a SCA, (b) poorly performing
managers are more likely to be disciplined even if there is no SCA; and thus,
(c) any SCA/discipline relation is merely a performance/discipline relation.
I examine this alternative hypothesis in robustness tests by ensuring that
the results hold in a propensity score matched sample and across industry
adjusted ROA quartiles. Second, CEOs/CFOs may become scape-goats. I
examine this in robustness tests by focusing on SCAs that induce a negative
market reaction.4
4I note that the results hold in the propensity score matched sample, the ROA sorts,
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3 Data and Sample Construction
The paper analyzes 416 securities class actions (SCAs) that occur between
1996 and 2007 and compares them to a control sample of non-litigated firms.
It examines managerial turnover, paycuts, and disciplinary takeovers in year
t+1 conditional on whether there was a class action in year t. The focus on
disciplinary action within one year of a litigation announcement (if any) is to
avoid contamination due to disciplinary action for unrelated reasons. Using
a control sample ameliorates any sample-selection bias that would arise if
the sample only included firms that suffered a SCA. The class actions are
law suits for issuing statements that the shareholders claim were false. The
litigation data is from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing House.
Firm-level data is from Compustat. Executive compensation data is from
Execucomp. The sample excludes firms that lack Compustat or Execucomp
data. Table 1 defines the variables. The subsequent sections explain the
variables in detail.
The sample construction is as follows. For each year t there is the sample
of all firms for which there is data in Compustat and Execucomp. For each
firm i, the dummy variable SCAi,t equals one if a securities class action is
initiated against it in year t. Therefore, in each year, there are two sets
of firms: (1) those that sustain a securities class action; and (2) those that
do not. The models do not require the SCA to be successful. This is
because the models analyze the relation between the initiation of a SCA in
year t and disciplinary action in year t+ 1. Many SCAs settle several years
after initiation.5 Thus, focusing on successful SCAs imposes look-ahead bias
and in models that only use negatively received SCAs.
5For example, the class action filed against Health South Corporation (ticker: HRC)
in October 1998 settled in February 2006. Similarly, the action initiated against Xerox
(ticker: XRC) in August 2000 settled in March 2008.
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and model-misspecification. Further, extending the window for disciplinary
action from t + 1 to (say) t + 4, to give the litigation time to conclude,
increases the risk of spurious correlation and contaminating factors driving
the results.
The sample excludes any observations for which the CEO’s age exceeds
70. This is because the literature generally classifies a departure as forced
if the CEO is below a certain age, usually between 60 and 70 years old
(see Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Jenter and Kanaan, 2010; Murphy
and Zimmerman, 1993). The study imposes this restriction on all models in
order to promote stability in the sample size.6
The total sample comprises 12,183 firm-year observations. This com-
prises 416 firm-years where there is a SCA, and 11,767 firm-year observa-
tions where there is no SCA. Table 2 contains sample composition by year.
The number of class actions per year has increased over time. Class actions
increased the most between 2001 and 2002, corresponding with the end of
the tech-boom, and with the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).
This suggests that regression models should include year dummies to control
for year effects, and should explicitly control for the introduction of SOX.
The key issues are then whether class actions destroy firm value, and if
so, whether they induce internal or external discipline. Thus, the following
sections consider whether class actions (a) reduce firm value (Section 4),
(b) increase the likelihood of CEO turnover (Section 5), (c) reduce CEO
pay (Section 6), and (d) induce disciplinary takeovers (Section 7). These
sections discuss the dependent and independent variables in more detail.
6Relaxing this assumption does not qualitatively change the results.
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4 Do securities class actions reduce firm value?
The threshold issue is whether securities class actions reduce firm value. I
predict that the market should react negatively to the announcement of a
SCA even if SCAs precipitate disciplinary action on average. The main rea-
sons are: (1) disciplinary actions are not certain, (2) even if the CEO/CFO
is certain to be replaced, the CEO’s/CFO’s successor is not certain, (3) the
SCA is a signal of some poor internal governance and management, this may
signal poor managerial ethics and indicate that the firm’s current price is
based on inaccurate disclosure.
I analyze value-destruction by assessing the market’s reaction to the
SCA. The market’s reaction to the litigation-announcement is a proxy for
whether litigation reduces firm value (following Masulis, Wang, and Xie,
2007; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). The buy-and-hold abnor-
mal returns following the litigation announcement are a proxy for the litiga-
tion’s long-term value implications (following Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007;
Megginson, Morgan, and Nail, 2004).
The proxy for the market’s reaction to the announcement is the cumula-
tive abnormal return surrounding the announcement. The abnormal return
on day t, denoted ARi,t, is the firm’s return on day t less the return pre-
dicted by an OLS estimation of the market model computed over the period
11-days before the announcement to 210 days before the announcement.7
The cumulative abnormal return from τ1 days before the announcement to
τ2 days after the announcement (denoted, CARi,(τ1,τ2)) is the sum of firm
i’s abnormal returns between days τ1 and τ2.
The proxy for persistence of any negative reaction is the buy and hold
abnormal return. This is the compound actual return less the predicted
7Section 8 ensures the results are robust to abnormal return specification.
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return. The predicted return derives from an OLS estimation of the market
model. The compounding occurs from day τ1 to day τ2. The buy and hold
abnormal return over the interval is denoted BHARi,(τ1,τ2).
The results suggest that litigated firms have significantly negative CARs
and BHARs. Table 3 contains the CARs and BHARs in Panel A and Panel
B, respectively. The results show that the market reacts significantly and
negatively to the announcement of a securities class action and this reaction
persists long-term.
This negative reaction to securities class actions holds both before and
after the implementation of SOX.) CARs and BHARs are significant and
negative in the pre-SOX and post-SOX subsamples. However, the CARs are
insignificantly more negative, and BHARs are significantly more negative,
before the introduction of SOX than after the introduction of SOX.
There are two key explanations for the impact of SOX. First, the num-
ber of SCAs increased after 2002. Many of these are (arguably) frivolous
(Choi, 2007; Coffee, 2006). Thus, the market might expect the SCA to
yield minimal damages. This might reduce the market’s reaction to the
announcement of the SCA. Second, and alternatively, it may be that SOX
improves firms’ internal governance mechanisms (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins,
and Kinney, 2007; Coates, 2007). This enables boards to discipline culpable
managers. Thus, the board can limit value-destruction. Further, if SCAs
precipitate a disciplinary takeover, they might imply the possibility of a
takeover premium. The market might realize this; and thus, the market
might react less negatively to SCAs that occur after SOX. This motivates
further analysis of the implications of class actions for CEOs and CFOs.
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5 Do securities class actions induce CEO and CFO
turnover?
Dismissal is one way to punish CEOs and CFOs. Thus, the issue is whether
litigation increases the likelihood that the CEO or CFO will leave the com-
pany immediately following the instigation of a securities class action.
5.1 Methodology
The first issue is whether securities class actions induce management turnover.
The CEO is the key manager of interest. However, class actions might also
induce turnover of other executives, such as the CFO.
There are two sets of models. The first set examines whether SCAs
increase the likelihood that the CEO/CFO will leave the company. This
induces three key models. The first two models, in Equations (1) and (2),
are logit models that examine the log-likelihood of the CEO, or the CFO,
leaving the company within a year of the class action.8 The third model,
in Equation (3), is a multinomial logit model whose dependent variable
examines the likelihood of neither the CEO nor CFO leaving, only the CEO
leaving, only the CFO leaving, or both the CEO and CFO leaving. The
study estimates the models for the full sample-period and for sub-samples
both before and after the imposition of SOX. The model has the following
general form:
I(CEO Leavest+1) = α+ I(SCAt)β +Controlstγ + ut (1)
I(CFO Leavest+1) = α+ I(SCAt)β +Controlstγ + ut (2)
8The results are robust to the choice of logit or probit model.
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Departuret+1 = α+ I(SCAt)β +Controlstγ + ut (3)
Here, I(CEO Leavest+1) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO
at time t leaves the company in year t + 1. Similarly, I(CFO Leavest+1)
is an indicator that equals one if the CFO in year t leaves in year t + 1.
The variable Departuret+1 is a categorical dependent variable that models
the outcomes (1) neither the CEO nor the CFO leaves; (2) only the CEO
leaves; (3) only the CFO leaves; and (4) both the CEO and the CFO leave.
The variable I(SCAt) is a binary variable that equals 1 if a SCA is initiated
against firm i in year t. The term Controlst is a set of control variables,
defined in Table 1, and discussed below. The terms α, β, and γ are regression
coefficients, and u is the error term. The models control for year fixed-effects
and cluster standard errors by 4-digit SIC code (following Petersen, 2009).
To avoid endogeneity, by construction, dependent variables post-date the
variable I(SCAt)and the control variables.
The second set of models set examines the likelihood that a CEO/CFO
who leaves the company will fail to obtain another board or executive posi-
tion. The issue is whether dismissal following a SCA harms the manager’s
job prospects. It does this if a manager who is fired is less likely to hold a
board or CEO position in the future. These models replace the dependent
variables in Equation (1) and Equation (2) with a dummy that equals one
if (a) the CEO (or CFO) is leaves the company, and (b) the CEO (or CFO)
falls out of the Execucomp database. This is under-inclusive because CEOs
and CFOs can obtain non-Execucomp employment (such as in private eq-
uity funds). Nonetheless, even if the fired manager obtains non-Execucomp
employment, failing to obtain Execucomp employment is still a punishment
because it removes an employment option.
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The models control for governance and firm variables that might affect
CEO turnover. Past performance might drive turnover. Strong past operat-
ing performance should reduce managerial turnover (Kang and Shivdasani,
1995; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). Proxies for this are the operating
performance scaled by total assets (‘OCF/Assets’) and the return on assets
(‘ROA’). Similarly, strong stock performance should reduce CEO turnover
(Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Jenter and Kanaan, 2010; Kang and
Shivdasani, 1995). Proxies for this are the firm’s Tobin’s Q (‘Tobin’s Q’)
and the industry adjusted stock return over the prior year (‘Stock Return’).
CEO turnover might increase after SOX. Linck, Netter, and Yang (2009)
find that after SOX, boards tend to have more outside directors, meet more
frequently, and include more lawyers. This should improve internal gover-
nance and facilitate turnover. Therefore the models include a SOX dummy
(‘I(SOX)’) that equals 1 if the observation post-dates SOX.
Several CEO and CFO characteristics might affect turnover. Perfor-
mance based compensation should reduce turnover. This is because performance-
based compensation positively correlates with performance (Jensen and Mur-
phy, 1990), and strong performance reduces the likelihood of being fired
(following Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). Proxies for this are the percent-
age of total CEO, or CFO, compensation that is incentive-based, denoted
‘Incentive/Total (CEO)’ and ‘Incentive/Total (CFO)’, respectively.
Turnover might increase with internal managerial entrenchment (Goyal
and Park, 2002; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Proxies for this are the percentage of
shares that insiders own (‘Insider Ownership’) and CEO-chairman duality
(‘CEO Chair Duality’).
Tenure and age might influence turnover. Older managers might be more
willing to accept redundancy packages and leave (see Lehn and Zhao, 2006;
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Milbourn, 2003; Weisbach, 1988). The natural logs of the CEO/CFO age
control for this (‘ln(CEO Age)’/‘ln (CFO Age)’). Similarly, if long tenure
represents CEO age, then it should increase turnover. However, tenure
might also reduce turnover if it enables the manager to generate a power-
base (Salancik and Meindl, 1984). Proxies for this are the natrual log of the
CEO’s/CFO’s tenure (‘ln(CEO Tenure)’/‘ln(CFO Tenure)’).
The presence of many anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) might indicate
managerial entrenchment and an accommodating board (Faleye, 2007). This
might reduce turnover. Therefore, the models control for the Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick (2003) index of 24-anti-takeover provisions (‘GIM’).9
Size and stability should influence turnover. Turnover should be lower
at capital-insensitive (cf technology intensive) firms because these firms are
less volatile and are easier to value. Proxies for this are the CAPEX inten-
sity (‘CAPEX/Sales’) and a dummy for whether the firm is a high-tech firm
as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004) (‘I(High Tech Firm)’). Similarly,
managers of large firms might be entrenched (following Moeller, Schlinge-
mann, and Stulz, 2004). This might reduce turnover. A proxy for this is
the natural log of the firm’s total assets (‘ln(Assets)’).
High free cash flows might induce agency conflicts and sub-optimal in-
vestment (following Jensen, 1986). This might precipitate turnover. A proxy
for this is the firm’s free cash flow scaled by its total assets (‘FCF/Assets’).
Conversely, debt might ameliorate this agency conflict. A proxy for this is
the firm’s total debt divided by its total assets (‘Debt/Assets’).
Industry concentration might influence turnover. DeFond and Park
(1999) suggest turnover is higher in competitive industries. Engel, Hayes,
9The ATP data is from IRRC (now RiskMetrics). IRRC only reports ATP data for
1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006. For years that IRRC does not report
data, the study uses the data from the last available year. Section 8 ensures that the
results are robust to ATP specification.
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and Wang (2003) find some evidence consistent with this. The models con-
trol for this by including the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘HHI’).
5.2 Results
The sample characteristics are in Table 4. The univariate statistics show
that CEOs are significantly more likely to leave the company if there was
a SCA in the prior year. There is no univariate evidence that CFOs are
more likely to leave the company. However, the results also show significant
differences in the control variables. This suggests that analysis within a
multivariate framework is necessary.
Table 5 examines the likelihood that a CEO will leave the company.
Columns 1-3 examine CEO turnover; Columns 4-6 examine CFO turnover.
The key result is that CEOs, but not CFOs, are more likeley to leave the
firm in year t + 1 if there was a SCA in year t. These results hold both
before and after the imposition of SOX.
The control variables yield some interesting results. First and unsur-
prisingly, older CEOs/ CFOs are more likely to leave the company at any
given time. Second, ATPs, as proxied by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003) index, do not consistently reduce CFO turnover. However, this is
unsurprising since ATPs are not designed to protect managers from internal
discipline. Third, longer-serving CEOs and CFOs are less likely to leave
the company, supporting the theory that long-serving managers are able to
generate a power base.
The multinomial logit results are in Table 6. The base case is that
neither the CEO nor the CFO are fired in year t+1. The results show that
litigation in the past year significantly increases the likelihood that (a) the
CEO alone will leave the company, or (b) both the CEO and the CFO will
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leave. SCAs do not increase the likelihood that the CFO alone will leave.
This is consistent with prior literature that shows (a) CEOs are named in
more securities actions than are CFOs (Tillman, 2009), (b) CEOs are the
primary person in charge and that CEOs are primarily blamed for poor
performance even if they are not soley responsible (see Dezso, 2009; Walker
and Wang, 2010).
Table 7 examines the likelihood that a manager who leaves is also unable
to obtain a future board or managerial position. The dependent variable in
Columns 1-3 (Columns 4-6) is an indicator that equals one if the CEO (CFO)
in year t leaves the company by the end of year t + 1 and also falls out of
Execucomp. The results indicate that the occurrence of a SCA in year t
makes it significantly less likely that a fired CEO will not obtain a future
board or executive position. There is no such evidence for CFOs. This
suggests that SCAs do have future career repercussions for CEOs.
Taken together, these results show: First, CEOs are significantly more
likely to leave a company in year t + 1 if their company suffered a SCA
in year t. Second, CFOs are more likely to leave the company but only if
the CEO also leaves the company. Third, Leaving the company after the
announcement of a SCA does harm CEO’s future job prospects.
6 Do securities class actions reduce the CEO’s and
the CFO’s income?
Firms may punish managers by reducing their compensation (Coughlan and
Schmidt, 1985). This should particularly involve a reduction in fixed salary-
based compensation because reducing incentive-compensation might might
further dis-align managers’ and shareholders’ incentives (following Kang,
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Kumar, and Lee, 2006; Mehran, 1995).
6.1 Methodology
The goal is to determine if the CEO’s or the CFO’s compensation falls
following the initiation of a securities class action. The compensation has
two presently relevant components: a fixed salary and a performance bonus.
Compensation can also involve stock grants. However, it is unclear whether
boards should reduce stock grants following a SCA; reducing stock grants is a
punishment, but it also reduces the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’
incentives. Thus, this paper focuses on the prediction that a well-functioning
board should penalize CEOs or CFOs by reducing their fixed compensation
and performance bonus.
Logit regressions examine whether the CEO’s, or the CFO’s, compen-
sation falls after the initiation of litigation. The models examine the log-
likelihood that (1) the fixed compensation falls, or (2) the bonus compen-
sation falls. Data on compensation is from Execucomp. The general form
regressions are in Equation (4) and Equation (5).
I(Salaryt+1 < Salaryt) = α+ I(SCAt)β +Controlstϑ+ ηt (4)
I(Bonust+1 < Bonust) = α+ I(SCAt)β +Controlstϑ+ ηt (5)
Here, I(Salaryt+1 < Salaryt) is an indicator that equals one if the CEO’s
(or CFO’s) fixed compensation is lower in year t + 1 than in year t. Simi-
larly, I(Bonust+1 < Bonust) is an indicator that equals one if the CEO’s (or
CFO’s) bonus compensation is lower in year t+1 than it was in year t. The
variable I(SCAt) is a dummy that equals 1 if a SCA is initiated against firm
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i in year t, and Controlst represents the controls. The terms α, β, and ϑ
are regression coefficients, and η is the error term. All models use year fixed
effects and standard errors clustered by 4-digit SIC code.
The control variables are variables that might affect executive compen-
sation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act might influence executive compensation.
Narayanan and Seyhun (2005) suggest that SOX reduced managerial in-
fluence the grant-date of securities. Further, Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2009)
find that that SOX reduced the level of compensation tied to managerial
risk-taking. Thus, the compensation models include ‘SOX’, a dummy that
equals 1 if the observation post-dates SOX.
Age and tenure should influence compensation. Ryan andWiggins (2001)
find a positive relation between the use of cash bonuses and CEO age. Fur-
ther, Milbourn (2003) finds a negative relation between stock-incentives and
CEO age. Thus, the models include the natural log of the CEO’s and
CFO’s age, denoted ‘ln(CEO Age)’ and ‘ln(CFO Age)’, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, long-serving managers have higher pay and more control over their
pay (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Hill and Phan, 1991). Thus, the mod-
els include the natural log of the number of years that the CEO, or CFO,
has been with the corporation (denoted ‘ln(CEO Tenure)’, and ‘ln(CFO
Tenure)’).
Managers are more likely to have higher pay if they have greater control
over the board (Boyd, 1994). They have greater control over the board if
they are also the chairperson of the board. However, prior evidence finds
weak (Conyon and Peck, 1998) or insignificant (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001)
relation between duality and compensation. Nonetheless, the models in-
clude ‘CEO Chair Duality’, a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO is also the
chairperson.
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Managerial entrenchment should increase compensation. Bebchuk, Fried,
and Walker (2002) suggest that managerial entrenchment could facilitate
rent-extraction and agency conflicts. Subsequently, Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker (1999) find that proxies for agency conflicts increase CEO com-
pensation, and Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) find that ATPs
enable managers to sustain super-normal compensation levels. Thus, the
models include the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index, ‘GIM’, as a
proxy for poor governance.10
Product-market competition should influence pay. Cuñat and Guadalupe
(2005) and Karuna (2007) find that product market competition increases
pay sensitivity. Thus, the models include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(‘HHI’).
The firm’s performance should influence the level of compensation (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990) and the structure thereof (Mehran, 1995). Thus, the
models include four measures of performance, Tobin’s Q (‘Tobin’s Q’), the
return on assets (‘ROA’), the operating performance (OCF/Assets) and the
industry adjusted stock return (‘Stock Return’).
Compensation should increase with firm size. There are two possible
reasons. First, the agency explanation is that firm-size increases manage-
rial entrenchment, which increases agency conflicts (Humphery-Jenner and
Powell, 2011; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). Agency conflicts
of managerial entrenchment give CEOs additional power, which they can
use to increase compensation (following Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Par-
rino, 1997). Second, the non-agency explanation is that larger firms are
more difficult to manage. The added complexity should induce higher pay
10As with the managerial turnover models, these models are robust to the choice of
ATP index, holding in models that use the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) 6-provision
index, the presence of a poison pill, or the presence of a classified board.
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(following Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Rose and Shepard, 1997). Sup-
porting either theory, prior evidence shows a positive relation between firm
size and CEO compensation (see Baker and Hall, 2004; Kostiuk, 1990; Zhou,
2000). Therefore, the models include the natural log of the firm’s total assets
(‘ln(Assets)’).
The level of free cash flow should influence CEO compensation. High
free cash flows (‘FCF/Assets’) should induce Jensen (1986) type agency
conflicts. These agency conflicts should increase overall compensation, and
should increase the proportion of compensation that comes from fixed salary
rather than incentives. Subsequently, Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) find
a negative relation between free cash flows and the level of incentive com-
pensation.
The level of capital expenditure, and conversely, the preference for tech-
nology, has a ambiguous impact on pay. Arguably, high levels of capital
expenditure should increase CEO pay since they should increase firm-size
(following Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang, 1996). However, other evidence
suggests that ‘risky’ investment, such as technology investment, is positively
related to option-based compensation (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). This sug-
gests that the level capex or technology might influence pay in general, but
might influence incentive-compensation and fixed-compensation differently.
The dummy ‘I(High Tech Firm)’ controls for whether the firm operates in
a high-tech industry, as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004), and the
variable ‘CAPEX/Sales’ controls for the level of capital expenditure.
6.2 Results
The univariate results, in Table 4, suggest that pay cuts in year t + 1 are
significantly more likely if a SCA is initiated in year t. The CEO logit results
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are in Table 8. The key finding is that fixed salaries and bonuses in year t+1
are likely to be lower if there was a SCA in year t. Because reductions in
salary are the most important type of compensation-penalty, this suggests
that boards do perform their oversight function. Supporting this, insider
ownership, CEO age, and CEO tenure and large firm-size do not protect
CEOs from reductions in fixed-compensation. The size-result in particular
is consistent with the Offenberg (2009) finding that large size does not ef-
fectively insulate managers from disciplinary takeovers. Nonetheless, poor
governance in the form of ATPs does protect CEOs from salary reductions.
An interesting result is that firm-size does not prevent salary reductions.
The CFO compensation results are in Table 9. The CFO results largely
echo the CEO results.
Overall, these results, coupled with the CEO/CFO turnover results, show
that boards can effectively internally discipline poor performing managers.
However, if the market perceives persistent agency conflicts, then a disci-
plinary takeover may occur.
7 Do securities class actions increase the chances
of a disciplinary takeover?
Takeovers are one way to exert external discipline upon poorly performing
managers and boards. Thus, the issue is whether a SCA in year t increases
the likelihood of a disciplinary takeover in year t+ 1. There is a possibility
that managers might make false statements precisely to encourage (or dis-
courage) a takeover. To address this, the study requires that the takeover
bid post-date the announcement of the SCA. It is implausible that a class
action would encourage a friendly takeover or promote superior deal terms.
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The models examine four possible definitions of a disciplinary takeover
attempt: (1) A mere bid for 100% of the company; (2) a completed bid
for the company; (3) a hostile or unsolicited bid for the company; or (4) a
hostile or unsolicited bid for the company that is subsequently completed.
The first two follow Offenberg (2009). The second two follow the logic that
the purpose of a disciplinary takeover is to replace the manager, and this
is likely to induce hostility (see Martin and McConnell, 1991). The general
regression equation is:
TOt+1 = α+ I(SCAt)β +Controlstγ + ut (6)
The dependent variable, TOt+1 is variously an indicator that (1) the
company receives a takeover bid in year t+1 (denoted, Bidt+1), (2) the com-
pany receives a bid that is subsequently completed (denoted Complete Bidt+1),
(3) the company receives a bid that SDC classifies as hostile or unsolicited
(Hostile Bidt+1), or (4) the company receives a bid that is hostile or unso-
licited, and that is subsequently completed (Hostile Complete Bidt+1). In
all cases the bid must be for 100% control of the company. The takeover
event data is from SDC. A deal is hostile if SDC records the takeover at-
tempt as ‘unsolicited’ or ‘hostile’. The key independent variable I(SCAt) is
an indicator of a securities class action being initiated in year t.
The control variables are variables standard in the takeover prediction
literature (see Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis, 2009; Powell, 2001, 2004,
1997). Specifically the models control for firm-level variables such as the
firm’s size (variable: ‘ln(Assets)’); Tobin’s Q (‘Tobin’s Q’); leverage (‘Debt/Assets’);
accounting operating performance (‘OCF/Assets’) and return on assets (‘ROA’);
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industry adjusted stock return (‘Stock Return’); free cash flow (‘FCF/Assets’);
CAPEX intensity (‘CAPEX/Sales’); whether the firm is in a high-tech in-
dustry (‘I(High Tech Firm)’); and, the concentration of the firm’s industry
as proxied by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (‘HHI’). Further, since the
purpose is to examine disciplinary takeovers, the models also control for
the CEO’s tenure (‘CeoTenure’); CEO-chairman duality (‘CEO Chair Du-
ality’); the CEO’s age (‘CEO Age’); the level of incentive compensation
(‘Incentive/Total (CEO)’); the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) gover-
nance index; and, the level of insider ownership (‘Insider Ownership’).
The univariate results in Table 4 suggest that a firm is significantly more
likely to receive a disciplinary takeover bid in year t+1 if a SCA was initiated
in year t. The logit results are in Table 10. The important result is that
a firm is significantly more likely to receive a disciplinary takeover bid if it
was sued under a securities class action in the prior year. This holds for all
four definitions of a disciplinary takeover.
The control variables indicate that ATPs do not effectively deter a disci-
plinary takeover (GIM is positive and significant in Columns 1 and 2). While
this appears anomalous, it is consistent with Comment and Schwert (1995)
and Humphery-Jenner (2011a). Further, consistent with Offenberg (2009),
large size does not effectively entrench managers. Interestingly, CEO-chair
duality reduces the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid (in Columns 1,
3, and 4). However, this may merely reflect the prevalence of CEO-chair
duality (featuring 67.6% of the sample).
Overall, these results, coupled with the pay-cut and turnover results,
show that SCAs do sound in internal and external discipline.
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8 Robustness
This section ensures that the results are robust to model specification is-
sues. Most response are unreported but are available on request. First, the
results are robust to the specification anti-takeover provisions. The results
hold in models that replace GIM with the presence of a staggered board (fol-
lowing Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005), the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008)
6-provision index, or a dummy to reflect the presence of a poison pill.
Second, the results are robust to other board-based variables. The results
hold in models that (a) use CeoAge, CfoAge, CeoTenure and CfoTenure
instead of the natural logs; (b) control for the size of the board; and (c)
control for the lagged natural log of the CEO’s total compensation, salary,
or incentive compensation.
Third, the results are robust to industry effects. The reported models
use year dummies and standard errors clustered by 4-digit SIC industry (fol-
lowing Petersen, 2009). However, Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009a)
suggests that governance-based results can be sensitive to the specificity
of the industry-classification. Thus, the robustness tests ensure the results
hold for (a) models that cluster by year and industry instead of using year
dummies, and (b) models that cluster standard errors by 2-digit and 3-digit
SIC industry code.
Fourth, the logit results are robust to other model specifications. The re-
sults hold in logit and probit models. Logit models are more robust to devia-
tions from the Probit’s normality assumption (following Hagle and Mitchell,
1992; Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972). Nonetheless, the results are not sen-
sitive to modeling technique.
Fifth, the returns results are robust to the definition of abnormal re-
turns. Thin trading can cause biased and inconsistent estimates of market
25
model parameters (Cowan, 1992; Cowan and Sergeant, 1996; Dimson, 1979;
Dimson and Marsh, 1983). To control for thin trading and non-synchronious
trading, the paper also uses Scholes-Williams estimates (following Scholes
and Williams, 1977). To control for auto-regressive and heteroscedastic re-
turns, the paper also uses and GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) estimates of
the market model (following Fatum and Hutchison, 2003; Mckenzie, Thom-
sen, and Dixon, 2004; Rayhorn, Hassan, Yu, and Janson, 2007). The results
hold in these specifications.
Sixth, the results are robust to sample-selection and pre-performance
issues. One possibility is that poorly performing managers make SCAs.
Poorly performing managers are more likely to be disciplined whether or
not there is a SCA. Thus, the SCA/discipline relation may merely be a
performance/discipline relation. I control for this in two ways:
The first method re-runs the regressions in industry adjusted ROA quar-
tiles (similarly to Frakes, 2007). The goal is to ensure that the results hold
for all ROA quartiles. I do not report the results, but they are available
on request. I find that the results hold in all quartiles and are marginally
stronger in high-performance quartiles. This implies that strongly perform-
ing firms are more likely to discipline misconduct.
The second method uses propensity score matching.11 The process is:
(1) Run a logit model to predict the likelihood that a firm receives a SCA in
year t as a function of variables from year t− 1. (2) Use the logit results to
estimate a propensity score.12 (3) For the sample of firms that do receive a
SCA in year t construct a 90% confidence interval for the propensity scores
(i.e. find the 5% and 95% cut-offs). (4) Let the final sample comprise only
11For some use of this see: Dehejia and Wahba (2002); Desyllas and Hughes (2010);
Egger, Eggert, and Winner (2010).
12For a logit model this is expxβ/(1 + expxβ).
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firms that receive a SCA in year t or have a propensity score within this 90%
interval. The (unreported) results hold in this propensity score restricted
sample.
Seventh, I ensure that the results hold for value-destroying SCAs. It is
interesting to ensure that the results hold for SCAs to which the market
reacts negatively (rather than just the occurrence of a SCA per se). Thus,
I replace the SCA dummy with an indicator that equals one if the firm
receives a SCA in year t and the market reacts negatively to it, denoted
‘I(Negative SCA)’. The results for the I(Negative SCA) variable echo those
for the I(SCA) variable.
Eighth, I ensure that coincidental regulatory actions do not drive the
results. I do this in two ways: (1) I remove all firms from the sample that
experience both a SCA and a regulatory action (the regulatory action can
occur at any time in the sample period). The results hold in this sample.
(2) I include a dummy variable that equals one if the firm receives both a
regulatory action and a SCA. This variable does not qualitatively change
the coefficient on the I(SCA) indicator.
9 Conclusion
This paper examines the ramifications of being sued for misleading the mar-
ket. The results show that if a firm receives a class action suit for misleading
the market, then the CEO and CFO are more likely to be fired or to suffer a
pay-cut, and the firm is more likely to sustain a disciplinary takeover. These
results are robust to other board, CEO, CFO, and corporate characteristics
that might explain the pay, turnover, and takeover findings.
The results make a key contribution to the literature. Prior studies focus
on regulator actions. This study focuses on securities class actions. This
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difference is important because (1) regulatory actions require the involve-
ment of the SEC; and thus, may not capture all fraud-related litigation;
and (2) the law governing SCAs is arguably sub-optimal. Further, unlike
prior studies, this paper examines whether securities fraud harms managers’
future job prospects and induces disciplinary takeovers.
The results have corporate and policy implications. They show that
even if the law governing market manipulation is doctrinally sub-optimal,
it is functional from a practical perspective. Managers are disciplined fol-
lowing securities class actions, suffering an increase chance of pay cuts and
dismissal. Further, securities class actions precipitate disciplinary takeovers.
Therefore, this paper supports the findings in Karpoff, Lee, and Martin
(2008), and shows that poor disclosure does promote discipline through both
internal and external channels.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Dependent or Explained Variables
CAR(τ1,τ2) The firm’s cumulative abnormal return from τ1 days before the announcement
of the SCA to τ2 days after the announcement of the SCA. The abnormal
return on day τ is the firm’s actual return less that predicted by a market
model estimated over 11 days before the announcement to 210 days before
the announcement.
CRSP
BHAR(τ1,τ2) The firm’s cumulative abnormal return from τ1 days before (or after) the
announcement of the SCA to τ2 days after the announcement of the SCA.
CRSP
I(CEO Leavest+1) An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO in year t is not the CEO in
year t+ 1.
Execucomp
I(CFO Leavest+1) An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CFO in year t is not the CFO in
year t+ 1.
Execucomp
Departuret+1 A categorical variables that equals 0 if neither the CEO nor the CFO leave,
equals 1 if only the CEO leaves, equals 2 if only the CFO leaves, and equals 3
if both the CEO and the CFO leave. All departures must be within one year
of the litigation announcement.
Execucomp
I(Salaryt+1 < Salaryt) An indicator variable that equals 1 if the manager’s fixed compensation







, where salaryt is the manager’s fixed
salary compensation in year t
Execuomp
I(Bonust+1 < Bonust) An indicator variable that equals 1 if the manager’s bonus compensation
(cf stock compensation) fallows in year t + 1. This is a dummy variable
that equals one if 0 > [(bonust+1 − bonust) /bonust], where bonust is the
manager’s bonus compensation in year t.
Execucomp
I(Bidt+1) An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover offer for
100% control in year t+ 1.
SDC Platinum
I(Complete Bidt+1) An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover offer for
100% control in year t+ 1 and the deal is subsequently completed.
SDC Platinum
I(Hostile Bidt+1) An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover offer for
100% control in year t+ 1, and SDC codes the deal as unsolicited or hostile.
SDC Platinum
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I(Hostile Complete Bidt+1) An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover offer for
100% control in year t + 1, the deal is subsequently completed, and SDC
codes the deal as hostile or unsolicited.
SDC Platinum
Independent Variables
I(SCAt) An indicator that equals one if the firm or the court announces a securities
class action in that year. The source is the Stanford Securities clearing house.
Stanford Securities Clearing-
house
HHIt The firm’s Hirfindahl-Hishmann Index at the time of the litigation. Compustat
Tobin’s Qt The firm’s Tobin’s Q in year t. Compustat
Stock Returnt The industry adjusted market return computed over the year before the liti-
gation. This is the firm’s return less the average return in the firm’s 4-digit
SIC industry.
CRSP
I(High Tech Firmt) An indicator that equals one if the firm is a ‘high-tech’ firm as defined in
Loughran and Ritter (2004).
Compustat
ln(Assetst) The natural log of the firm’s total assets (Compustat mnemonic: at) in year
t.
Compustat
OCFt/Assetst The firm’s operating performance in year t. The operating performance in a
given year is the firm’s operating cash flow (Compustat mnemonic: oibdp)
divided by the firm’s total assets (Compustat mnemonic: at).
Compustat
ROAt The firm’s return on assets in year t. The return on assets is the firm’s
net income (Compustat mnemonic: ni) divided by the firm’s total assets
(Compustat mnemonic: at).
Compustat
Debtt/Assetst The firm’s leverage in year t. Leverage is the firm’s long term debt (Com-
pustat mnemonic: dltt) divided by its market value of assets. The market
value of assets is assets less book equity plus market equity (in Compustat
mnemonics: at - ceq + csho×prcc c).
Compustat
FCFt/Assetst The firm’s free cash flows in year t divided by its assets in year t. Free cash
flow is the operating cash flow less expenditures on interest, tax, and capex
(in Compustat mnemonics: oibdp - xint - txt - capx).
Compustat
CAPEXt/Salest The firm’s capex intensity in year t. Capex intensity is the firm’s expendi-
ture on capex (Compustat mnemonic: capx) divided by its sales (Compustat
mnemonic: sale).
Compustat
I(SOXt) An indicator that equals 1 if the observation post-dates the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.
N/A
GIMt The firm’s Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index in year t. RiskMetrics/ IRRC




ln(CFO Tenuret) The natural log of the number of years the CFO has been at the company in
year t.
Execucomp
ln(CEO Aget) The natural log of the CEO’s age in year t. Execucomp
ln(CFO Aget) The natural log of the CFO’s age in year t. Execucomp
Incentivet/Totalt (CEO) The proportion of the CEO’s total compensation that is incentive based (i.e.
stock-linked) in year t. In Execucomp codes this is [(tdc2t − salaryt) /salaryt]
Execucomp
Incentivet/Totalt (CFO) The proportion of the CFO’s total compensation that is incentive based (i.e.
stock-linked) in year t. In Execucomp codes this is [(tdc2t − salaryt) /salaryt]
Execucomp
CEO Chair Dualityt An indicator that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board in
year t.
Execucomp




Table 2: Class Actions by Year
Table 2 contains the sample composition by year. Column 1 contains the number of all
firms in the sample. Column (2) contains the number of firms that sustain a class action
in year t ∈ {1996, . . . , 2007}. Column 3 contains the number of control firms in year
t ∈ {1996, . . . , 2007}.
Year All SCA This Year No SCA This
Year
(1) (2) (3)
1996 886 9 877
1997 833 25 808
1998 1154 32 1122
1999 1083 40 1043
2000 1066 32 1034
2002 1193 60 1133
2003 1182 44 1138
2004 1240 62 1178
2005 1198 42 1156
2006 1207 29 1178
2007 1141 41 1100
Total 12183 416 11767
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Table 3: Abnormal Returns
Table 3 contains abnormal returns. It considers the full sample of securities class actions (SCAs), and sub-samples of SCAs that occur before SOX
and after SOX. Panel A contains short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based upon an OLS estimation of the market model. Panel B
contains buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using ttests
for means and signrank tests for medians.
Window All Pre SOX Post SOX Pre-SOX - Post-SOX
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Short Run CARs
(-5,+5) -0.077∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.040∗ -0.013
(-3,+3) -0.064∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.009
(-1,1+) -0.037∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.007
(-1,0) -0.035∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.012
(-0,+1) -0.015∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.005 -0.012∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.008 -0.002
Panel B: Long Run BHARs
(-5,+28) -0.079∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.062∗
(-5,+35) -0.082∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.038
(-5,+200) -0.129∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.123∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(-5,+250) -0.178∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(-5,+300) -0.184∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.193∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗
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Table 4: Univariate Statistics
Table 4 contains univariate statistics (means). Column 1 contains statistics for firms that
sustain a class action suit. Column 2 contains statistics for the control sample. Column
3 contains the difference between Column 1 and Column 2. Table 1 contains the variable
definitions. Superscripts ∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively,
for means using a ttest (Column 1 and Column 2) or difference in mean (for Column 3).
Variable All SCAi,t No SCAi,t Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)-(3)
Panel A: CEO and CFO Turnover
I(CEO Leavesi,t+1) 0.059
∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
I(CFO Leavesi,t+1) 0.011
∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.014
Panel B: CEO and CFO Salary Reductions
I(CEO Salaryt+1 < CEO Salaryt) 0.341∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
I(CEO Bonust+1 < CEO Bonust) 0.489∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
I(CFO Salaryt+1 < CFO Salaryt) 0.776∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
I(CFO Bonust+1 < CFO Bonust) 0.904∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
Panel C: Disciplinary Takeover Statistics
I(Bidt+1) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
I(Complete Bidt+1) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
I(Hostile Bidt+1) 0.007∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
I(Hostile Complete Bidt+1) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.008∗
Panel D: Control Variables
Incentivet/Totalt (CEO) 0.624∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
CEO Tenuret 6.165∗∗∗ 5.372∗∗∗ 6.193∗∗∗ -0.821∗∗
CEO Aget 55.170∗∗∗ 54.366∗∗∗ 55.199∗∗∗ -0.832∗∗∗
Incentivet/Totalt (CFO) 0.227∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
CFO Tenuret 4.923∗∗∗ 5.510∗∗∗ 4.905∗∗∗ 0.605
CFO Aget 49.120∗∗∗ 48.587∗∗∗ 49.139∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗
CEO Chair Dualityt 0.661∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ -0.042∗
Insider Ownershipt 0.035∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ -0.008∗
GIMt 9.260∗∗∗ 9.077∗∗∗ 9.266∗∗∗ -0.189
I(High Tech Firm)t 0.162∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
HHIt 0.335∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ -0.013
Stock Returnt -0.009∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
Tobin’s Qt 1.996∗∗∗ 2.231∗∗∗ 1.988∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
Debtt/Assetst 0.141∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
Assetst 10,972.840∗∗∗ 53,131.720∗∗∗ 9,482.396∗∗∗ 43,649.324∗∗∗
OCFt/Assetst 0.136∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗
ROAt 0.035∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
FCFt/Assetst 0.035∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ -0.005
CAPEXt/Salest 0.080∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ -0.008
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Table 5: CEO and CFO Turnover Regressions
Table 5 contains logit regressions for Equation (1) and Equation (2). Columns 1 to 3 examine the log-likelihood of the CEO leaving
in year t + 1. Columns 4 to 6 examine the log-likelihood of a CFO leaving in year t + 1. Columns 1 and 4 examine the full sample;
Columns 2 and 5 the sample from before SOX; and, columns 3 and 6 the sample from after SOX. The key independent variable is SCA,
a dummy that equals one if the firm has a class action filed against it in year t. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets
contain p-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
I(CEO Leavest+1) I(CFO Leavest+1)
All Pre-SOX Post-SOX All Pre-SOX Post-SOX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(SCAt) 1.421∗∗∗ 1.789∗∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗ 0.42 0.388 0.547
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.290] [0.483] [0.494]
I(SOXt) -0.300∗∗∗ -1.103∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.000]
Insider Ownershipt 0.186∗∗∗ -0.007 0.174∗∗∗ -2.634 -2.298 -3.346
[0.000] [0.995] [0.000] [0.150] [0.293] [0.330]
Incentivet/Totalt (CEO) 0.724∗∗∗ -0.006 1.273∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.980] [0.000]
ln(CEO Tenuret) -1.199∗∗∗ -1.347∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln(CEO Aget) 0.809∗∗ 1.459∗∗∗ 0.257
[0.016] [0.008] [0.529]
Incentivet/Totalt (CFO) 2.899∗∗∗ 2.539∗∗∗ 3.719∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln(CFO Tenuret) -0.441∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗ -0.059
[0.000] [0.000] [0.733]
ln(CFO Aget) -0.337 -0.736 0.171
[0.743] [0.579] [0.931]
CEO Chair Dualityt -0.664∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ -0.634∗∗∗ -0.354∗ -0.282 -0.429
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.065] [0.201] [0.198]
GIMt 0.015 0.018 0.017 -0.04 -0.03 -0.053
[0.256] [0.375] [0.334] [0.208] [0.453] [0.324]
I(High Tech Firmt) -0.038 -0.057 -0.026 0.26 0.252 0.146
[0.760] [0.826] [0.882] [0.384] [0.486] [0.752]
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HHIt 0.065 0.013 0.052 -0.253 0.046 -0.946
[0.681] [0.955] [0.798] [0.543] [0.928] [0.205]
Stock Returnt -0.363∗∗ -0.209 -0.533∗∗ -1.343∗∗∗ -1.370∗∗∗ -1.306∗
[0.015] [0.330] [0.039] [0.000] [0.008] [0.071]
Tobin’s Qt -0.079∗ -0.001 -0.236∗∗ -0.220∗∗ -0.161 -0.396∗∗
[0.055] [0.977] [0.011] [0.021] [0.116] [0.049]
Debtt/Assetst 1.687∗∗ 2.114 1.776 3.717∗∗ 4.740∗∗∗ 0.781
[0.033] [0.119] [0.132] [0.036] [0.006] [0.883]
Debtt/Assetst × Tobin’ Qt -0.952 -1.598 -0.902 -2.286 -3.141∗∗ 0.011
[0.129] [0.174] [0.314] [0.116] [0.035] [0.998]
ln(Assetst) -0.024 0.052 -0.094∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗
[0.362] [0.268] [0.009] [0.000] [0.008] [0.003]
OCFt/Assetst -0.771 -0.838 0.104 -3.261∗∗ -1.103 -8.018∗∗∗
[0.328] [0.420] [0.926] [0.045] [0.504] [0.009]
ROAt -0.248 -1.027 -0.244 0.09 -0.974 2.322
[0.249] [0.104] [0.300] [0.889] [0.291] [0.148]
FCFt/Assetst 0.802 2.265 -0.259 1.781 -0.262 6.381∗∗
[0.359] [0.106] [0.806] [0.424] [0.914] [0.029]
CAPEXt/Salest 0.024 0.334 -0.124 -0.139 -0.588 0.308
[0.908] [0.267] [0.772] [0.885] [0.623] [0.540]
Constant -4.622∗∗∗ -7.504∗∗∗ -2.442 0.163 1.243 -2.085
[0.000] [0.000] [0.136] [0.967] [0.807] [0.791]
Observations 12,183 5,022 7,161 12,183 5,022 7,161
Wald χ2 857.2388 291.6766 549.0072 256.4369 107.2143 252.1088
p-value(χ2) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R2 15.94% 19.03% 15.51% 14.38% 10.09% 17.42%
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Table 6: Multinomial Logit Regressions
Table 6 contains multinomial logit regressions for Equation (3). The base outcome is that
neither the CEO nor the CFO are removed. Columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively examine the
outcomes of only the CEO leaving, only the CFO leaving, and both the CEO and the CFO
leaving. The CEO and the CFO must be less than 70 years old. The main independent
variable is SCA, a dummy that equals one if the firm has a class action filed against it
in year t. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values calculated
using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies.








I(SCAt) 1.410∗∗∗ -0.163 2.494∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.782] [0.000]
I(SOXt) -0.164∗ -0.972∗∗∗ -0.943∗
[0.100] [0.000] [0.068]
Insider Ownershipt 0.190∗∗∗ -1.827 -57.658∗∗
[0.000] [0.277] [0.049]
Incentivet/Totalt (CEO) -0.675∗∗∗ -0.404∗ 0.145
[0.000] [0.084] [0.790]
ln(CEO Tenuret) 0.694∗∗∗ -1.626∗∗∗ 0.265
[0.001] [0.001] [0.818]
ln(CEO Aget) -1.186∗∗∗ -0.009 -1.205∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.940] [0.000]
Incentivet/Totalt (CFO) 0.720∗∗ -0.029 3.77
[0.032] [0.968] [0.271]
ln(CFO Tenuret) -0.085 3.535∗∗∗ 2.481∗∗∗
[0.518] [0.000] [0.001]
ln(CFO Aget) -0.202∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.003] [0.000]
CEO Chair Dualityt 0.452 -0.594 3.238
[0.559] [0.552] [0.551]
GIMt 0.02 -0.017 -0.131
[0.136] [0.586] [0.171]
I(High Tech Firmt) -0.051 0.299 -0.07
[0.683] [0.326] [0.907]
HHIt 0.01 -0.544 0.777
[0.952] [0.227] [0.311]
Stock Returnt -0.304∗∗ -1.135∗∗ -1.795∗
[0.042] [0.010] [0.055]
Tobin’s Qt -0.071∗ -0.157∗ -0.652
[0.083] [0.088] [0.231]
Debtt/Assetst 1.735∗∗ 2.832 9.086
[0.029] [0.102] [0.165]
Debtt/Assetst × Tobin’s Qt -0.91 -1.303 -7.742
[0.148] [0.357] [0.190]
ln(Assetst) -0.016 -0.168∗∗ -0.581∗∗∗
[0.560] [0.043] [0.000]
OCFt/Assetst -0.745 -3.001 -1.595
[0.365] [0.118] [0.657]
ROAt -0.286 0.531 -0.109
[0.183] [0.624] [0.898]
FCFt/Assetst 0.972 2.098 -0.694
[0.282] [0.490] [0.887]
CAPEXt/Salest 0.013 -0.973 0.622∗∗∗
[0.954] [0.437] [0.009]








Table 7: CEO and CFO Post-Turnover Employment
Table 7 contains logit regressions that examine the likelihood that a fired CEO fails to obtain another board or executive position.
The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 (Columns 4-6) is a dummy that equals one if the CEO (CFO) in year t (a) leaves the company
by the end of year t + 1 and (b) drops out of Execucomp. Columns 1 and 4 examine the full sample; Columns 2 and 5 the sample
from before SOX; and, columns 3 and 6 the sample from after SOX. The key independent variable is SCA, a dummy that equals one
if the firm has a class action filed against it in year t. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values calculated
using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
I(CEO leaves the company and Execucomp) I(CFO leaves the company and Execucomp)
All Pre-SOX Post-SOX All Pre-SOX Post-SOX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(SCAt) 1.688∗∗∗ 1.958∗∗∗ 1.582∗∗∗ 0.282 0.005 0.742
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.565] [0.995] [0.335]
I(SOXt) -0.340∗∗ -1.086∗∗∗
[0.023] [0.000]
Insider Ownershipt 0.218∗∗∗ -0.241 0.216∗∗∗ -3.467 -3.398 -2.679
[0.000] [0.878] [0.000] [0.181] [0.284] [0.482]
Incentivet/Totalt (CEO) 1.519∗∗∗ 0.783∗ 2.140∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.096] [0.000]
ln(CEO Tenuret) -0.417∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.005]
ln(CEO Aget) 3.643∗∗∗ 5.070∗∗∗ 2.604∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Incentivet/Totalt (CFO) 2.750∗∗∗ 2.588∗∗∗ 3.236∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln(CFO Tenuret) -0.307∗∗ -0.476∗∗ -0.061
[0.025] [0.028] [0.768]
ln(CFO Aget) 1.122 1.36 0.404
[0.320] [0.239] [0.880]
CEO Chair Duality -1.073∗∗∗ -1.105∗∗∗ -1.030∗∗∗ -0.165 -0.139 -0.161
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.444] [0.583] [0.661]
GIMt 0.018 0.003 0.027 -0.029 -0.022 -0.045
[0.474] [0.939] [0.427] [0.428] [0.645] [0.398]
I(High Tech Firmt) -0.024 -0.053 -0.028 0.143 -0.007 0.265
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[0.908] [0.901] [0.922] [0.652] [0.988] [0.606]
HHIt 0.359 0.055 0.464 0.031 0.234 -0.278
[0.137] [0.897] [0.123] [0.947] [0.694] [0.702]
Stock Returnt -0.579∗∗ -0.402 -0.495 -1.721∗∗∗ -1.547∗∗∗ -2.530∗∗∗
[0.045] [0.361] [0.234] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Tobin’s Qt -0.084 -0.042 -0.166 -0.247∗∗ -0.154 -0.576∗
[0.324] [0.677] [0.293] [0.023] [0.150] [0.059]
Debtt/Assetst 3.358∗∗ 3.266∗ 4.042∗∗ 4.174∗∗ 5.593∗∗∗ 0.227
[0.010] [0.068] [0.039] [0.049] [0.005] [0.968]
Debtt/Assetst × Tobin’s Qt -2.067∗∗ -2.727∗ -2.172 -2.633 -4.170∗∗ 1.148
[0.049] [0.083] [0.141] [0.146] [0.021] [0.778]
ln(Assetst) -0.161∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.245∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.517] [0.000] [0.000] [0.045] [0.001]
OCFt/Assetst -2.651∗∗ -1.723 -2.834 -2.067 -1.182 -3.357
[0.048] [0.340] [0.232] [0.341] [0.659] [0.293]
ROAt -0.374 -0.553 -0.371 0.07 -1.217 3.095∗∗
[0.134] [0.699] [0.114] [0.896] [0.231] [0.044]
FCFt/Assetst 1.992 2.259 1.814 -0.769 -1.365 -0.264
[0.219] [0.341] [0.470] [0.796] [0.740] [0.947]
CAPEXt/Salest 0.091 0.478 -0.129 -2.339 -2.169 -3.53
[0.818] [0.399] [0.924] [0.153] [0.313] [0.277]
Constant -17.044∗∗∗ -22.774∗∗∗ -13.002∗∗∗ -6.093 -7.583∗ -3.081
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.156] [0.072] [0.775]
Observations 12,183 5,022 7,161 12,183 5,022 7,161
Wald χ2 260.5532 152.5718 256.5931 243.2075 127.1541 244.4777
p-value(χ2) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R2 9.28% 11.82% 9.39% 13.30% 9.77% 14.99%
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Table 8: CEO Compensation Regressions
Table 8 contains logit regressions for Equation (4), and (5), where the dependent variables relate to whether the CEO’s fixed or bonus
compensation decreases. Columns 1 and 2 examine the full sample period; Columns 3 and 4 examine the pre-SOX period and Columns
5 and 6 examine the post-SOX period. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 3, and 5 is an indicator that equals one if the CEO’s
fixed compensation decreases. The dependent variable in Columns 2, 4, and 6 is an indicator that equals one if the CEO’s bonus
compensation (excluding vesting or exercised options) decreases. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values
calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Sample All Pre-SOX Post-SOX












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(SCAt) 0.325∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.000] [0.016] [0.000] [0.012] [0.000]
I(SOXt) -0.055 0.409∗∗∗
[0.313] [0.000]
Insider Ownershipt 3.198∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗ 3.106∗∗∗ 1.898∗∗∗ 3.329∗∗∗ 1.019∗
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.055]
ln(CEO Tenuret) -0.150∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.020] [0.001]
CEO Chair Dualityt -0.282∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
ln(CEO Aget) -0.475∗ -0.189 -0.516 -0.418 -0.45 0.047
[0.053] [0.346] [0.147] [0.177] [0.139] [0.863]
GIMt -0.038∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.000] [0.122] [0.003] [0.001] [0.008]
I(High Tech Firmt) 0.162∗ 0.126 0.082 0.115 0.203 0.133
[0.098] [0.150] [0.347] [0.285] [0.149] [0.244]
HHIt 0.13 0.263∗∗ 0.108 0.179 0.154 0.309∗∗
[0.406] [0.018] [0.584] [0.289] [0.384] [0.028]
Stock Returnt -0.032 -0.949∗∗∗ -0.103 -1.023∗∗∗ 0.052 -0.861∗∗∗
[0.624] [0.000] [0.358] [0.000] [0.530] [0.000]
Tobin’s Qt 0.009 -0.063∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.054∗∗ 0.029 -0.081∗∗
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[0.673] [0.005] [0.894] [0.013] [0.474] [0.037]
Debtt/Assetst 0.862 0.937∗∗ 1.440∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗ 0.512 0.347
[0.108] [0.025] [0.049] [0.007] [0.468] [0.535]
Tobin’s Qt × Debtt/Assetst -0.571 -0.809∗∗∗ -1.243∗∗ -1.098∗∗∗ -0.198 -0.535
[0.163] [0.004] [0.031] [0.004] [0.707] [0.152]
ln(Assetst) 0.095∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.017] [0.000] [0.000] [0.030]
OCFt/Assetst -1.666∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗ -1.283 1.880∗∗ -2.002∗∗∗ 0.579
[0.003] [0.032] [0.121] [0.023] [0.006] [0.423]
ROAt -0.412 -0.826∗∗ -0.129 -1.339∗ -0.509 -0.646
[0.238] [0.040] [0.789] [0.055] [0.245] [0.167]
FCFt/Assetst 0.275 -2.108∗∗∗ -0.629 -2.571∗∗∗ 0.856 -1.718∗
[0.600] [0.001] [0.427] [0.002] [0.287] [0.050]
CAPEXt/Salest -0.176 -0.463 -0.01 -0.612∗∗ -0.39 -0.375
[0.211] [0.271] [0.968] [0.033] [0.208] [0.496]
Constant 1.194 2.355∗∗∗ 1.581 3.405∗∗∗ 0.831 1.664
[0.211] [0.003] [0.243] [0.005] [0.487] [0.123]
Observations 11,463 11,463 4,711 4,711 6,752 6,752
Model Wald χ2 230.7387 427.853 139.6993 277.2969 161.7654 177.1846
p-value(χ2) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R2 2.98% 4.28% 3.49% 4.63% 3.03% 2.92%
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Table 9: CFO Compensation Regressions
Table 9 contains logit regressions for Equation (4), and (5), where the dependent variables relate to decreases in the CFO’s fixed or
bonus compensation. Columns 1 and 2 examine the full sample period; Columns 3 and 4 examine the pre-SOX period and Columns
5 and 6 examine the post-SOX period. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 3, and 5 is an indicator that equals one if the CFO’s
fixed compensation decreases. The dependent variable in Columns 2, 4, and 6 is an indicator that equals one if the CFO’s bonus
compensation (excluding vesting or exercised options) decreases. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values
calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Sample All Pre-SOX Post-SOX












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(SCAt) 0.267∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.231 0.892∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗ 1.096∗
[0.054] [0.003] [0.210] [0.003] [0.037] [0.079]
I(SOXt) 1.091∗∗∗ 2.680∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000]
Insider Ownershipt 0.833∗ 0.04 0.827 0.553 1.189∗ -0.019
[0.090] [0.868] [0.138] [0.375] [0.078] [0.566]
ln(CFO Tenuret) 0.291∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.410∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.886] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000]
CEO Chair Dualityt 0.096 -0.059 -0.064 -0.115 0.204∗∗∗ 0.122
[0.108] [0.487] [0.478] [0.228] [0.007] [0.549]
ln(CFO Aget) -7.290∗∗∗ -1.764∗∗ -0.116 0.481 -18.137∗∗∗ -10.950∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.043] [0.883] [0.555] [0.000] [0.000]
GIMt 0 -0.021 -0.019 -0.037∗∗ 0.002 0.052
[0.972] [0.122] [0.163] [0.011] [0.859] [0.165]
I(High Tech Firmt) 0.002 0.066 -0.22 -0.044 0.187∗ 0.48
[0.981] [0.558] [0.114] [0.725] [0.081] [0.235]
HHIt -0.399∗∗∗ -0.169 -0.169 -0.1 -0.649∗∗∗ -0.423
[0.002] [0.267] [0.321] [0.568] [0.001] [0.230]
Stock Returnt 0.282∗∗ -0.469∗∗∗ 0.133 -0.536∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.515
[0.015] [0.000] [0.218] [0.000] [0.001] [0.299]
Tobin’s Qt 0.122∗∗∗ 0.031 0.120∗∗∗ 0.017 0.150∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗
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[0.000] [0.205] [0.000] [0.491] [0.005] [0.030]
Debtt/Assetst 2.147∗∗∗ 1.931∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗ 1.622∗∗∗ 1.965∗∗ 2.037
[0.000] [0.001] [0.017] [0.008] [0.044] [0.301]
Tobin’s Qt × Debtt/Assetst -1.076∗∗∗ -1.296∗∗∗ -0.695 -1.170∗∗∗ -0.583 -0.875
[0.001] [0.001] [0.109] [0.005] [0.428] [0.539]
ln(Assetst) -0.014 -0.039 0.083∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.119∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗
[0.494] [0.170] [0.005] [0.833] [0.000] [0.001]
OCFt/Assetst -0.854 1.203∗ -0.899 1.467∗ -1.229 -2.842
[0.134] [0.094] [0.188] [0.070] [0.164] [0.138]
ROAt -1.529∗∗∗ -1.950∗∗∗ -0.241 -1.653∗∗ -3.311∗∗∗ -2.754
[0.001] [0.002] [0.553] [0.014] [0.000] [0.288]
FCFt/Assetst 1.920∗∗∗ -0.478 0.941 -1.024 3.516∗∗∗ 4.930∗∗
[0.001] [0.514] [0.210] [0.255] [0.000] [0.016]
CAPEXt/Salest 0.044 -0.292 0.285 0.048 -0.018 -0.437∗∗
[0.846] [0.101] [0.405] [0.886] [0.945] [0.030]
Constant 28.628∗∗∗ 8.662∗∗ 1.006 0.099 72.604∗∗∗ 47.020∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.012] [0.742] [0.975] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 12,049 12,049 4,927 4,927 7,122 7,122
Model Wald χ2 1172.041 727.1431 56.7948 92.9828 611.2427 173.2314
p-value(χ2) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R2 11.03% 18.32% 1.41% 1.75% 18.21% 12.14%
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Table 10: Disciplinary Takeover Regressions
Table 10 contains logit regressions for Equation (6). The dependent variables in Columns 1 to 4 are indicators that equal one if (1)
the firm receives a bid in year t + 1, (2) the firm receives a bid and the deal is subsequently completed, (3) the firm receives a bid
and SDC classifies the bid as unsolicited or hostile, and (4) the firm receives a bid, that bid is unsolicited or hostile, and the deal is
subsequently completed. In all cases, the bid must be for 100% control. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain
p-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
I(Bidt+1) I(Complete Bidt+1) I(Hostile Bidt+1) I(Hostile Complete
Bidt+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(SCAt) 1.031∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗ 1.881∗∗
[0.000] [0.001] [0.011] [0.018]
I(SOXt) 0.133 -0.274 -0.015 -1.352
[0.660] [0.522] [0.973] [0.127]
Incentivet/Totalt (CEO) 0.21 0.426 0.466 0.37
[0.468] [0.332] [0.325] [0.737]
Insider Ownershipt 0.975 0.506 -0.017 -0.049
[0.265] [0.728] [0.922] [0.989]
ln(CEO Tenuret) -0.014 -0.072 0.082 -0.093
[0.866] [0.524] [0.469] [0.649]
CEO Chair Dualityt -0.427∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗ -0.575∗∗ -0.975∗∗
[0.010] [0.042] [0.023] [0.036]
ln(CEO Aget) -0.809 -1.091 -1.073 -0.939
[0.162] [0.264] [0.192] [0.647]
GIMt 0.077∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.039 0.048
[0.003] [0.009] [0.314] [0.607]
I(High Tech Firmt) -0.051 -0.197 0.599∗ 0.452
[0.846] [0.584] [0.053] [0.476]
HHIt -0.585 -0.997 0.066 0.685
[0.140] [0.143] [0.893] [0.440]
Stock Returnt 0.260∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.32 0.358
[0.077] [0.001] [0.183] [0.600]
Tobin’s Qt 0.039 0.005 -0.038 0.004
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[0.618] [0.964] [0.725] [0.968]
Debtt/Assetst 2.408∗ 1.537 1.777 -0.634
[0.083] [0.271] [0.437] [0.872]
Debtt/Assetst × Tobin’ Qt -1.025 -0.118 -0.613 0.721
[0.287] [0.900] [0.702] [0.781]
ln(Assetst) 0.210∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.028] [0.000] [0.004]
OCFt/Assetst 0.392 0.668 4.064∗ -0.613
[0.805] [0.784] [0.092] [0.906]
ROAt -0.552∗∗ 1.026 -0.635 -0.138
[0.027] [0.571] [0.172] [0.943]
FCFt/Assetst -0.202 -2.912 -3.976 -2.911
[0.909] [0.208] [0.164] [0.650]
CAPEXt/Salest 0.018 -0.552 -2.323∗ -2.3
[0.963] [0.482] [0.076] [0.385]
Constant -2.941 -2.224 -4.145 -4.551
[0.198] [0.559] [0.180] [0.545]
Observations 12,183 12,183 12,183 8,651
Wald χ2 169.2236 96.8082 169.8056 454.9805
p-value(χ2) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R2 6.67% 7.77% 8.25% 11.16%
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